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Abstrat The purpose of this paper is to introdue a novel family of trans-
ferable utility games related to ongested networks. We assume that players
are tra oordinators, who expliitly route their deliveries in the network.
The osts of the players are determined by the total lateny of the deliveries,
whih in turn an be alulated by the edge lateny funtions. Sine the edge
lateny funtions assign a lateny value to the total ow on the orresponding
edge, as ooperating players redesign their routing in order to minimize their
overall ost, outsiders will be aeted as well. This gives rise to externalities
therefore the resulting game is desribed in partition funtion form. We show
that ooperation may imply both negative and positive externalities in the de-
ned game. We assume that oalitions may determine their routing aording
to dierent preditive strategies. We show that the inreasing order of predi-
tive strategies may onverge to a Nash equilibrium, although onvergene is
not guaranteed, even if a unique Nash equilibrium exists. Furthermore we an-
alyze the superadditivity and stability properties of the game, and show that
subadditivity may arise and the reursive ore may be empty if the lateny
funtions are not monotone or not ontinuous.
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1 Introdution
Problems onerning ongested networks originate traditionally from the eld
of engineering (Altman et al, 2006). Probably this is the reason why non-
ooperative approah is more wide-spread among the researhers of the sub-
jet
1
. The rst general model is due to Wardrop (1952), where the network is
represented by a graph, while routing tasks are assigned to a subset of nodes
and lateny funtions are dened on the edges. Furthermore it is assumed that
the tra an be divided into innitesimally small parts whih therefore an
be represented as ows in the graph. The objetive of these innitesimally
small piees or individuals is to minimize the experiened lateny.
Many equilibrium notions were introdued to analyze suh ongested net-
works (for a omprehensive study see Roughgarden (2005, 2006)). Most of the
literature fouses on Nash equilibria and a related onept the so-alled Prie
of Anarhy (Feldmann et al, 2003). In a ongested network Nash equilibrium
(NE) is reahed when no individual an obtain a lower lateny by unilaterally
hanging his route. In general, suh a NE need not be unique. The Prie of
Anarhy is the ratio between the soial ost of the worst Nash equilibrium and
the overall optimum solution. The notion was introdued by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou (2009) and quikly beame popular as it suessfully aptures
the possible suboptimality of NE-points. To resolve suh situations Stakelberg
routing was introdued (Korilis et al, 1997) in whih model a ertain ratio of
all users are obeying to a entral authority whose objetive is to drive the
tra toward an equilibrium point with lower soial ost. In partiular there
are two types of players a so-alled leader and followers. The goal is to nd a
strategy for the leader that fores the followers to reat in a way that mini-
mizes the total lateny in the system. For more on this topi see Karakostas
and Kolliopoulos (2009).
A possible logial extension of the above model is to onsider more than one
leader. In other words there are a few distinguished players that altogether are
responsible for the whole tra in the network. The original Wardrop model
is inherently non-ooperative, while a setup where all the players are "leaders"
is essentially ooperative. The objetive of eah player is to route his tra
with minimal ost. Sharing information and ooperation with other agents
may result in ost savings, and more eient utilization of network apaities.
Depending on the employed strategy of the agents many possible ooperative
games an arise. Our aim is to introdue and analyze these wide variety of
transferable utility (TU) games. Sine the formation of a oalition may aet
other players osts via the implied ow and the resulting edge load hanges in
the network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in
partition funtion form.
The values of the oalitions are dened as the improvement ompared to
the referene ase, when no ooperation appears. As some oalitions form,
1
Although the ooperative (non-TU) approah is also often used in the ase of wireless
ommuniation networks Khandani et al (2007)
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routing paths may alter due to the joint optimization proess, whih may in
turn aet the osts of other players via the modied edge latenies. Sine
suh externalities may happen the game is given in partition funtion form
(Thrall and Luas, 1963).
A senario where multiple navigation systems are routing their lients on
the same tra network represents a possible appliation of the dened game
theoreti model framework. Novel teleommuniation systems an be onsid-
ered as an other potential appliation eld of the proposed approah (Altman
et al, 2006; Khandani et al, 2005, 2007; Devroye et al, 2008)
The struture of the paper is as follows. In setion 2 we introdue the
notation used, dene the partition funtion form ooperative game on the
routing network and summarize the onsidered routing strategies. The main
results are disussed in setion 3, where we show that the sequene of iterative
preditive strategies of inreasing order may onverge to routing onguration,
whih is a Nash equilibrium (NE), but this onvergene is not always neessary
even if a unique NE exists. Furthermore we analyze the superadditivity and
stability properties of the game, and via the reursive ore onept we show
that overall ooperation may not be always beneial for the players.
2 Materials and methods
In this setion we dene delivery games and introdue the tra routing and
game theoreti framework that is needed to analyze suh games. We made an
eort to keep the notational traditions of both elds. To make it more legible
we employ the standard that the upper index always refers to some player or
a oalition and in ase of ows the lower index is always some edge or a path.
First let us reall some basi notions of ooperative games. A ooperative
game with transferable utility or simply a TU-game is an ordered pair (N, v)
onsisting of the player set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a harateristi funtion
v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. The value v(S) is regarded as the worth of oalition
S. The members of S an ahieve this value by ooperating regardless of how
players outside the oalition reat. In a partition funtion form (PFF) game
v(S) depends also on the partition to where S belongs (Thrall and Luas,
1963). Let Π(N) denote the set of partitions of N . An embedded oalition is a
pair (S, π), where S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, and π ∈ Π(N) is suh that S ∈ π. We denote
by C(N) the set of embedded oalitions on N . Then a partition funtion form
game is a pair (N, V ) where V : C(N) → R. For a more thorough2 denition
see (Grabish and Funaki, 2012).
2
The literature often uses a simplied formalization, namely V : pi → (2N → R) where
the partition funtion assigns a harateristi funtions (vpi) to eah partition pi ∈ Π(N).
This notation is more intuitive, but misleading a little bit as vpi is not a proper hara-
teristi funtion, sine vpi(T ) is not dened for T 6∈ pi. For sake of onveniene as well as
larity throughout the paper we will regard V as a mapping from partitions to harateristi
funtions.
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For S ∈ π, the worth of V (S, π) denotes the amount that the players in S
an guarantee themselves by ooperating, when the oalition S is embedded
in the partition π.
Aording to the transferable utility assumption, ooperating players may
redistribute the wealth gained by ooperation among themselves. The redistri-
bution is formalized via the onept of payos. We all the pair ω = (x, π) an
outome, where π ∈ Π(N) is a partition and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN is a payo
vetor satisfying feasibility;
∑
i∈S x
i = V (S, π) for all S ∈ π. Let us denote
the the set of outomes in (N, V ) by Ω(N, V ). Next we dene the onepts,
whih will be required for the denition of the PFF delivery game.
2.1 The Network and routing
The game takes plae on a network Γ , whih is a pair (G, l), represented by a
direted graphG(W,E), desribed by the set of verties and edges respetively,
and a set of edge lateny funtions l = {le|e ∈ E}. The deliveries of the players
are represented as ows in G. Lateny funtions desribe how the lateny of a
ertain edge depends on its atual resulting ow. It is ommonly aepted to
make some onstrains on the lateny funtion, suh as non-negativity, dier-
entiability and non-dereasingness. We will only assume non-negativity thus
le : R≥0 → R≥0.
A delivery task τ = (r, s, t) ∈ R+ ×W ×W of a player is desribed by a
quantity and two nodes (a soure and sink respetively). To eah player j ∈ N
kj delivery tasks are assigned τ j = ∪k
j
i=1{(r
j
i , s
j
i , t
j
i )}. The set of all distint
paths from sji to t
j
i is denoted by P
j
i . Distint paths do not have to be disjoint
in general, in other words, they may have ommon edges. We denote the
ow of player j on path P by f jP . Then P
j def= ∪k
j
i=1P
j
i and P
def
= ∪j∈N
(
Pj
)
.
Therefore P ontains all the possible routes between soures and sinks. Players
have to distribute their tra on the available paths for eah delivery task.
Formally, we say that f j
def
= ∪(P∈Pj)f
j
P is a feasible solution for player j i∑
P∈P
j
i
f jP = r
j
i for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k
j}. Regarding ooperating players, the
ow of a oalition S is denoted by fS
def
= ∪j∈Sf
j
, and it is feasible if f j is
feasible for every j ∈ S. The set of feasible solutions is denoted by F.
2.2 Routing strategies
Players and oalitions may route their delivery on the available paths aord-
ing to dierent possible strategies. These are shortly desribed below, and
demonstrated in setion 3. The expression 'routing strategy' is interpreted in
a wide sense, inluding information and beliefs about other players. The zero
order strategy assumes that the players have no information about eah other
while in other ases the delivery tasks are ommon knowledge. The strategies
presented here are pure in the sense that players may route their deliveries
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distributed among multiple dierent paths in the same time but they do it
with probability 1. Furthermore we assume that ooperating players are al-
ways aware of eah other's routing tasks and determine their routing by joint
design. We denote a spei routing strategy by σ and the set of all possible
pure routing strategies by Σ.
2.2.1 Evaluation of osts and expeted osts
We will use the following notation. The ow of player j on edge e is omposed
of the dierent path ows, whih inlude the edge: f je =
∑
P∈Pj :e∈P fP , while
the ow of oalition S on edge e is fSe =
∑
j∈S f
j
e (regarding the total ow of
edge e, for onveniene sake instead of fNe we write shortly fe).
The load of edge e with respet to agent j is the tra that goes through the
edge not ounting f je . We denote this by λ
j
e, formally λ
j
e =
∑
k 6=j f
k
e = fe−f
j
e .
Similarly λSe =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S f
T
e = fe − f
S
e . The expeted load of edge e with
respet to oalition S is the ow that goes through e not ounting fSe aording
to the urrent knowledge of S (whih depends on the oalition struture and
σ). We denote this by λ̂Se .
The expeted ost of a oalition S is
cexp(S) =
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e + f
S
e ) · f
S
e . (1)
Note that the value of (1) depends on the routing strategy the players use
and the partition π embedding S. The resulting ost of the oalition S is
c(S) =
∑
e∈E
le(fe) · f
S
e (2)
where fe is determined by omputing argminfS∈F c
exp(S) for every S ∈ π. In
other words eah oalition in a given partition has an estimate of how muh
tra will appear on ertain edges of the network (λ̂Se ) and then determines
its routing by minimizing its (expeted) ost based on this knowledge. As we
will see later the atual ost c(S) indued this way an be quite dierent than
the expeted ost. The value of λ̂Se in (1) is determined by the applied strategy
as follows.
2.2.2 Zero order strategy
This "dummy" strategy assumes that all oalitions neglet the ativity of
others, and route their deliveries in a way, whih is optimal when no other
tra appears on the network. This strategy assumes that non-ooperating
players/oalitions have no information of eah others routing tasks. In other
words λ̂Se = 0 for eah edge e ∈ E and for eah oalition S ∈ 2
N
.
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2.2.3 First order preditive (FOPS) and n-th order preditive (nOPS) strategy
We dene the rst order preditive strategy as follows. Every oalition expets
the remaining oalitions to route their deliveries aording to the zero order
strategy, and minimizes his routing osts aording to this. This strategy as-
sumes that the oalitions are aware of the other partiipants delivery ontrats.
Formally, let us denote the resulting ow of edge e in the zero order routing
- when every oalition applies zero order strategy - by fe(σ0). In this ase
λ̂Se (σ1) = fe(σ0)− f
S
e (σ0). In the seond order preditive strategy (SOPS) all
oalitions assume that the remaining ones will route their delivery aording
to the FOPS et.
2.3 Denition of the PFF form delivery game
Next we dene the delivery game, and show how the value of a ertain oalition
S embedded in a partition π an be alulated.
Denition 1 A delivery game D = (N,Γ,∆, σ) is a 4-tuple onsisting of a
player set N , a network Γ , a set of delivery tasks ∆ = ∪jτ j and a routing
strategy σ.
The harateristi funtions are dened then as follows. The value of a
oalition S in a partition π is
v(D,pi)(S) =
∑
j∈S
c(D,pi0)(j)− c(D,pi)(S) (3)
where π0 is the referene, all singleton partition. In other words, the value of
a oalition in a ertain partition is the dierene between the total routing
ost of its partiipants and the overall ost of its members in the all singleton
partition. We will see that the players do not always benet by forming a
oalition, hene v an be negative.
Finally the partition funtion related to the delivery game D is the funtion
VD(π) that assigns to eah partition π ∈ Π(N) the harateristi funtion
v(D,pi)(S). To simplify the notation, we omit the lower index (D,pi) in the ase
of the ost, expeted ost and harateristi funtions from now on.
2.3.1 Routing under Nash equilibrium
Having dened the game, we an expand our list of possible strategies with
another one. Let A be an algorithm that omputes a NE for a given routing
problem (N,Γ,∆). Furthermore let σ(A) be the routing strategy that routes
the delivery tasks as in the NE omputed by A. Then D(N,Γ,∆, σ(A)) is a
delivery game. The equilibrium strategy of oalition S is denoted by sS
σ(A).
Note that the strategy of S is naturally equivalent to the set of ows of S,
namely fS .
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3 Results
In this setion we demonstrate the various possibly arising properties of the
dened game on various networks and examples.
3.1 Basi properties of preditive strategies
The preditive tehnique is an elemental way to strategially approah a game
theoretial problem. The most diult part is to guess the depth of reasoning
of the other players. A fair assumption is that the players think that they go
at least one step further than the others. Here we only analyzed the ase when
the depth of reasoning is the same for all players and oalitions, and every
ator thinks that the other players take one step less in the reasoning proess.
Now we state a straightforward but important result.
Theorem 1 Let D be a delivery game, π = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} a partition of N
and let sσn = (f
S1(σn), f
S2(σn) . . . , f
Sk(σn)) denote the n-th order preditive
strategy. If sσn+1 = sσn then sσm = sσn for all m > n furthermore the resulting
routing will be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: A routing strategy s˜ = (f˜S1 , f˜S2, . . . , f˜Sk) is a NE if for all S ∈ π
argmin
fS∈F
c(D,pi)(S) = argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(λ˜
S
e + f
S
e ) · f
S
e = f˜
S .
where λ˜Se =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S f˜
T
e .
If the n-th and the n+1-th order preditive strategies oinide, it means
that fS(σn) = f
S(σn+1) for all S ∈ π, thus the expeted and atual load of
any edge e is the same. Formally
λ̂Se (σn+1) =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn) =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn+1) = λ̂
S
e (σn+2).
It follows that sσm = sσn for all m > n. By the denition of the expeted
ost
fS(σn+1) = argmin
fS∈F
cexpσn+1(S) = argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e (σn+1) + f
S
e )f
S
e =
= argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn) + f
S
e ) · f
S
e =
= argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn+1) + f
S
e ) · f
S
e .
for all S ∈ π, hene it is indeed a NE.
We an obtain a useful orollary of Theorem 1 by reinterpreting the players
strategy. We an think of fS as a |P| dimensional vetor. The oordinates of
8 Dávid Csersik, Balázs Sziklai
fS orresponds to the ows of the distint paths between the soures and
sinks. In this way it is meaningful to speak about the pointwise onvergene
of fS.
Corollary 1 Let D be a delivery game with ontinuous lateny funtions. If
limn→∞ sσn = (f˜
S1 , f˜S2 , . . . , f˜Sk) = s˜ where f˜Si ∈ RP for i = 1, 2, . . . , k then
s˜ is a NE.
In other words if the ows of inreasing order preditive strategies are
onvergent, they onverge to a NE point.
3.2 Externalities and the onvergene of nOPS to NE
Let us onsider network 1 depited in Fig. 1. We take into aount 3 players in
order to be able to demonstrate the appearing externalities in the game. In this
simple example all players have one delivery task, and the nodes orresponding
to the sinks and soures are disjoint.
a
b
1
d
1
e
0.5+x
c
x
1
f
1
3
6
 (3)
(3)
(6)
x
3
a
b
d
e
c f
x2
x3
3-x2-x3
6-x1
6
x1
Fig. 1 The basi struture of the network 1, and the possible routing alternatives of the
players. The numbers with and without parentheses quantify sinks and soures respetively.
Player 2 an route his delivery of 6 units via two ways (the distribution among the two
optional paths is desribed by x1), while player 3 an route his delivery of 6 units via three
ways (the distribution among the three optional paths is desribed by x2 and x3)
Let us suppose the following delivery tasks: τ1 = (3, a, d), τ2 = (6, b, f),
τ3 = (3, c, e). Player one has no hoie (|P1| = 1), player 2 has two possible
options (|P2| = 2), and thus has one deision variable x1, whih desribes the
proportion regarding the distribution of his delivery among the two available
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paths. Player 3 has 3 available paths (|P3| = 3), thus he has two deision
variables (x2 and x3).
The detailed alulations of this example an be found in Appendix A. The
resulting partition funtion in the ase of zero order strategy is summarized
in Table 1.
partition (pi) values of oalitions (v(S))
{1},{2},{3} 0,0,0
{1,2},{3} 2.625, -0.75
{1,3},{2} 1.8437, 0.1875
{1},{2,3} 0.75, 7.125
{1,2,3} 12.375
Table 1 The resulting partition funtion of network 1 in the ase zero order strategy.
Table 1 learly demonstrates the emergene of both positive and negative
externalities in the ase of zero order strategy. As oalitions {1} and {2}merge,
it implies a negative externality on player 3, while in ontrast the merging of
oalitions {1} and {3} or {2} and {3} is beneial for the player not inluded
in the ooperation (player 2 and 1 respetively).
3.2.1 The onvergene of nOPS to Nash equilibrium
After the alulation of the FOPS, we are able to analyze the higher order
strategies in the ase of various oalition strutures. Tables 2 and 3 summarize,
how the resulting routing variables, and ost of the oalitions hange, while
onseutively applying higher order strategies.
Partition {1}, {2}, {3} {1, 2},{3} {1, 3},{2}
Strategy
Zero order
1 (FOPS)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x1 x2 x3
3.5 1.5 1.25
4 2.5 0.5
4.13 2.63 0.38
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
x1 x2 x3
4.25 1.5 1.25
4.75 2.5 0.5
4.86 2.81 0.19
4.95 2.84 0.16
4.96 2.86 0.14
4.97 2.87 0.13
4.97 2.87 0.13
4.97 2.87 0.13
4.97 2.87 0.13
x1 x2 x3
4 1.63 1.38
4 2.5 0.5
4.13 2.63 0.38
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
4.17 2.67 0.33
Table 2 The evolution of routing variables [x1, x2, x3] of network 1 towards NEs as the
order of strategies inreased.
Let us note that the resulting NE oinides in the ase of the all-singleton
partiton and {1, 3}{2}.
As we an see in tables 2 and 3, all oalition strutures reah the Nash
equilibrium with the auray of ε = 10−2 in the 5th iteration.
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Partition {1}, {2}, {3} {1, 2},{3} {1, 3},{2}
Strategy
Zero order
1 (FOPS)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
c1 c2 c3
17.25 42 12.62
15 38 10.25
14.63 37.45 10.27
14.53 37.32 10.27
14.51 37.29 10.28
14.5 37.28 10.28
14.5 37.28 10.28
14.5 37.28 10.28
14.5 37.28 10.28
c{1,2} c3
56.63 13.38
51.5 10.63
49.93 10.45
49.78 10.46
49.68 10.46
49.67 10.46
49.67 10.46
49.67 10.46
49.67 10.46
c{1,3} c2
28.03 41.81
25.25 38
24.9 37.45
24.8 37.32
24.79 37.29
24.78 37.28
24.78 37.28
24.78 37.28
24.78 37.28
Table 3 The evolution of resulting osts of the oalitions in network 1 towards NEs as the
order of strategies inreased.
The partition {1}, {2, 3} is not of interest, beause player 1 has no deision
variables, in this ase all nOPS with n>1 will be the same as the FOPS. The
routing in the ase of the grand oalition is the same in all ases (onsider e.g.
π = {1, 2, 3}) assuming zero order strategy.
As we sill see in setion 3.3, the FOPS, SOPS, nOPS sequene of strategies
is not neessary onvergent. Furthermore, as we will show, a NE may exist in
a game with divergent nOPS.
3.3 Divergent nOPS
In this setion we demonstrate on the widely used Pigou network (Pigou, 1920)
that the sequene of the inreasing order strategies is not neessary onvergent
even if a unique NE exists in the game.
3.3.1 Routing under Nash equilibrium on Pigou's graph
Let ΓP be the well-known example of Pigou i.e. a graph with two parallel edges
(u and w) onneting two nodes (s and t). On the so alled upper edge u the
lateny is onstant 1, on the lower edge w the lateny is proportional to the
tra (see Fig. 2). Furthermore let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players with
delivery tasks τ j = (rj , s, t) i.e. player j has to route rj amount of tra from
s to t. Let A be an algorithm that omputes a Nash equilibrium in ΓP and let
σ(A) be the orresponding routing strategy. Therefore D(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)) is a
well dened delivery game.
Note, that the lateny ost of player j is
c(j) = rj − f jw + f
j
w · fw = r
j + (λjw − 1) · f
j
w + (f
j
w)
2
As rj is onstant c(j) is uniquely determined by how muh the players
route on the lower edge. Note that σ(A) = (f1w, f
2
w, . . . , f
n
w) is a NE point if
no player j ∈ N an obtain smaller lateny ost by altering his strategy.
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s t
1
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Fig. 2 Network 2: Pigou's graph.
Theorem 2 If rj ≥ 1
n+1 for any player j ∈ N , where n = |N | then there is a
unique Nash equilibrium point in D(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)), namely where fw =
k
k+1
and fSw =
1
k+1 for any S ∈ π, where k = |π|.
Proof: It is enough to prove for the singleton partition. For other partitions
the theorem follows from the fat that eah oalition an be onsidered as a
separate player and if rj ≥ 1
n+1 for all j ∈ N then r
S =
∑
j∈S r
j ≥ 1
n+1 for
all S ∈ π.
Suppose players follow the same strategy. Then eah player j ∈ N routes
rj−x amount of tra on the upper and x amount on the lower edge. This is a
Nash equilibrium point if for any real number δ ∈ R, suh that 0 ≤ x+ δ ≤ rj ,
if player j routes δ amount of tra in a dierent way, his individual ost is
inreasing. Formally
rj − (x+ δ) + (x+ δ)(n · x+ δ) ≥ rj − x+ (x)(n · x).
We an rewrite the above ondition as follows.
δ2 + δ · x · (n+ 1)− δ ≥ 0
Whih yields
1− |δ|
n+ 1
≤ x ≤
1 + |δ|
n+ 1
for any real number δ. We an onlude that x = 1
n+1 is a Nash equlibrium
strategy for any number of player n.
Now we prove that this is a unique NE point. First suppose that fw <
n
n+1 .
In partiular let fw =
n
n+1 − ǫ1. Then there exists j suh that f
j
w =
1
n+1 − ǫ2
where ǫ2 along with ǫ1 are some positive real numbers. Let m
def
= min(ǫ1, ǫ2).
Now inreasing f jw by m dereases c(j).
rj − (f jw +m) + (f
j
w +m) · (fw +m) ≤ r
j − f jw + f
j
w · fw (4)
Whih is equivalent to
(f jw +m) · (fw +m− 1) ≤ f
j
w · (fw − 1).
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For instane if m = ǫ2
( 1
n+ 1
− ǫ2 +m
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 +m− 1
)
≤
( 1
n+ 1
− ǫ2
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 − 1
)
( 1
n+ 1
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 + ǫ2 − 1
)
≤
( 1
n+ 1
− ǫ2
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 − 1
)
ǫ2
n+ 1
≤
−n · ǫ2
n+ 1
+ ǫ1 · ǫ2 + ǫ2
0 ≤ ǫ1 · ǫ2
Similar alulations shows that (4) also holds when m = ǫ1. We leave the
proof of the ase fw >
n
n+1 to the reader.
3.3.2 Routing under nOPS strategies on Pigou's graph
Now we show that for any partition π ∈ Π(N) that onsists of at least 3
oalition, we an set the delivery tasks in suh way that the nOPS strategies
do not onverge to the NE point inD(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)). It is lear from Theorem
2 that if π is xed then for every S ∈ π, the zero order strategy is
sS0 =
{
fSw =
∑
j∈S r
j if
∑
j∈S r
j < 1/2
fSw = 1/2 otherwise.
If the number of players and the delivery tasks are suh that λSw ≥ 1 for
every S ∈ π then FOPS of every oalition will be to route everything on the
upper edge. Then again the SOPS will be the same as the zero order strategy
and so on. Therefore nOPS does not neessarily onverge as n goes to innity,
even when there is a unique Nash equilibrium point in a given D.
3.4 Subadditivity
Intuitively one would expet that the delivery game is superadditive. When a
oalition is formed it gains extra information from the new members. The sum
λ̂Se +f
S
e that determines the lateny of the edge e seems to be more ontrollable
as S gets larger. However this impression turns out to be wrong. We show two
examples of the arising subadditive property for two dierent strategies.
3.4.1 An example of subadditivity in the ase of zero order strategy
In this example we demonstrate the subadditivity property on a symmetri
three player example assuming zero order strategy. In this three player example
the ooperation of any two players implies negative onsequenes for them and
a positive externality for the third player. The explanation for the phenomena
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is that the routing orresponding to the expeted minimum ost result in a
higher overall ost, implied by the other players' ativity.
Let us onsider network 3 depited in Fig. 3 and a delivery game with
τ1 = (2, a, t), τ2 = (2, b, t) and τ3 = (2, c, t).
b
t
x2
x2
a
c
f
d
e x2
o
o
o
oo
o
Fig. 3 The basi struture of network 3.
Coalition struture {i},{j},{k}
Beause of the symmetry, eah player will route his delivery distributed equally
between the two available paths. This will result in 2 units of tra on eah
line, and a total ost of 8 of eah player.
Coalition struture {i,j},{k}
It is easy to see that the ooperating players will route their total delivery
distributed equally among the 3 pathways available for them The resulting
routing e.g. in the ase of the oalition struture {1, 2}, {3} will be as depited
in Fig. 4.
b
t
7/3
7/3
a
c
f
d
e 4/3
2/3
4/3
2/3
4/31
1 4/3
4/3
2/3
2/3
1
1
Fig. 4 Routing in the ase of oalition struture {1,2},{3}
The ost of the oalition {1, 2} will be c({1, 2}) = 16.88 whih is 0.88 units
higher than their total ost in singleton onguration (v({i, j}) = −0.88). The
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ost of the third player will be c(3) = 2(1 + 2/3)2 = 5.556 whih implies
v({k}) = 2.444
Grand oalition
In the ase of the grand oalition, the resulting routing and routing osts will
be as the same as in the ase of singleton oalitions, whih means that these
two oalition ongurations are the stable partitions of the game.
3.4.2 An Example of subadditivity assuming Nash routing strategy
Let us onsider three players with the same delivery task τ1−3 = (1, s, t) on
the Pigou network. It follows from Theorem 2 that for oalition struture
π0 = {1}{2}{3} at the NE point every player routes 14 amount of tra on
the lower edge. Therefore eah player has
3
4 ·1+
1
4 ·
3
4 = 0.9375 lateny ost. For
oalition strutures π = {i}{j, k} the Nash equilibrium strategies are dierent
as oalition {j, k} ats as one player. Therefore at the NE-point there ows 23
tra on the lower edge. The ost of oalition {i} is 23 · 1 +
1
3 ·
2
3 = 0.88˙ while
{j, k} has 53 · 1 +
1
3 ·
2
3 = 1.88˙ ost. Sine 1.88˙ > 2 · 0.9375 = 1.875, we an
see that the ooperation of players j and k is not beneial for them, whih is
an example of subadditivity. If the grand oalition is formed then there goes
1
2 tra on the bottom road. The overall ost is
5
2 · 1 +
1
2 ·
1
2 = 2.75. Table 4
summarizes the above omputation.
partition (pi) ost of players (c(j)) values of oalitions (v(S))
{i},{j},{k} 0.9375, 0.9375, 0.9375 0,0,0
{i,j},{k} 1.8888˙, 0.8888˙ -0.0138, 0.0487
{i,j,k} 2.75 0.0625
Table 4 Routing osts and oalitional values in the ase of the Pigou example (network 2)
assuming Nash routing.
3.5 Stability
To analyze stability and determine a harateristi funtion for a ertain strat-
egy we use the onept of the reursive ore Kózy (2007, 2009), that allows
the remaining, residual players to freely reat and form a ore-stable partition
before the payo of the deviating oalition is evaluated.
First we dene the residual game over the set R ( N . Let us reall that
Π(N) denotes the set of partitions of N . Assume R = N \ R have formed
πR ∈ Π(R). Then the residual game (R, VpiR) is the PFF game over the player
set R with the partition funtion given by Vpi
R
(S, πR) = V (S, πR ∪ πR).
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Denition 2 (Reursive ore Kózy (2007)) For a single-player game the
reursive ore is trivially dened. Now assume that the oreRC(N, V ) has been
dened for all games with |N | < k players. For an |N | player game an outome
(x, π) is dominated if there exists a oalition Q forming partition π′ and an
outome (y, π′ ∪ πQ) ∈ Ω(N, V ), suh that yQ > xQ and if RC(Q, Vpi′) 6= ∅
then (yQ, πQ) ∈ RC(Q, Vpi′). The (reursive) ore RC(N, V ) of (N, V ) is the
set of undominated outomes.
Based on the onept of the Reursive Core, a minimal laim funtion
an be dened, whih desribes the minimal laim of eah oalition in the
orresponding PFF game redued to that oalition. This funtion, termed vmc
in the following, may be applied in the same spirit as a harateristi funtion,
sine it assigns a unique value to eah oalition, whih they an seure for
themselves if they deviated. The formal denition of vmc is as follows.
Denition 3 Let us onsider the residual game (S¯, VpiS ) over the player set
S dened by the partition funtion VS(R, πS) = V (R, πS ∪S) where R ∈ πS ∈
Π(S). Let us denote the Reursive Core of the residual game by RC (S¯, VS).
The (pessimisti) minimal laim funtion vmc an be dened as
vmc(S) =
{
min∑
i∈S
xi{Ω(N, V )|(x, P
S) ∈ RC(S¯, VS)} if RC(S¯, VS) 6= ∅
min∑
i∈S
xi{Ω(N, V )} if RC(S¯, VS) = ∅
where vmc(S) is the minimal laim of oalition S.
With the help of the minimal laim funtion, a haraterization of the
Reursive Core an be given as follows.
Lemma 1 The Reursive Core RC(N, V ) of the game (N, V ) is a olletion
of Pareto eient outomes (x, π) ∈ Ω(N, V ), suh that there is no oalition
S with vmc(S) >
∑
i∈S x
i
.
3.5.1 The stability of example 1
Aording to the onept of the reursive ore, the minimal laim funtions
regarding the strategies of various order an be determined. The minimal laim
funtions in the ase of zero order strategy and FOPS are summarized in Table
5.
The reursive ore an be represented as a polytope in the payo spae.
As the order of preditive strategies inrease, we may derive the reursive ore
for eah PFF game. Using this method, we get a sequene of reursive ore-
polytopes, whose geometry may dier in general. We an depit the evolution
of the geometry of the reursive ore as the order of the applied strategy
inreases (see Fig. 5). The singleton referene ase and so the oalitional values
and payos are dierent for eah strategy. However as we inrease the order
of the applied strategy the routing variables and the values of the partition
funtion onverge to the NE and the geometry of the reursive ore onverge
to its nal shape.
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Coalition Value
{1} 0.75
{2} 0.1875
{3} -0.75
{1,2} 2.625
{1,3} 1.8437
{2,3} 7.125
{1,2,3} 12.375
Coalition Value
{1} -0.25
{2} 0
{3} -0.375
{1,2} 1.5
{1,3} 0
{2,3} 1.875
{1,2,3} 4
Table 5 Minimal laim funtions derived by the reursive ore method of example 1 in the
ase of zero order strategy and FOPS
Fig. 5 The projetion of the reursive ore in the ase of various strategies to the plane
x3=0. The equation x3 = v({1, 2, 3}) − x1 − x2 holds in every ase. Let us remember that
the ost of the referene ase (the all singleton oalitions) aording to whih the values of
the oalitions in dierent partitions are determined, is dierent in the ase of eah strategy
- that is the reason why the overall payo tends to derease.
3.5.2 Emptiness of the reursive ore
In this subsetion we show two examples, where the reursive ore turns out
to be empty.
Non-monotone edge lateny funtions
In this setion we demonstrate that the reursive ore may be empty if we
assume a network with an edge with non-monotone lateny funtion (depited
in Fig.6), and routing tasks δ1 = (1, a, t), δ2 = (1, b, t), δ3 = (1, c, t).
Sine the network is symmetri, we may onsider the {i}, {j}, {k} permu-
tation of players 1,2 and 3. Zero order strategy and the oalition struture
{i},{j},{k} will result in a symmetri onguration, in whih eah player will
route his delivery on the 0.5 lateny edge. This results in a total ost of 0.5 of
eah player.
In ontrast, if we assume the oalition struture {i,j},{k}, then {i,j} will
route his tra on the (x − 2)2 edge at the ost of 0  v({i, j}) = 1, while
Tra Routing Oligopoly 17
1
2
4
3
(X-2)2
1
(3)
1
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
5
(0)
1
2
4
3
(X-2)2
1
(3)
1
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
5
0.2949
0.7051
0.2949
0.7051
0.7051
0.2949
Fig. 6 Example network with non-monotone edge lateny funtion and resulting routing
in the ase of the grand oalition.
the third player is not aeted (v(k) = 0). In the ase of the grand oalition:
c({1, 2, 3}) = 0.4705 v({1, 2, 3}) = 1.0295. It is easy to see that this results
in the emptiness of the reursive ore.
Non-ontinuous edge lateny funtions
Consider the following example (see Fig.7)
3
whereN = {1, 2, 3}, players follow
zero-order strategy and the delivery tasks are τ1 = (1.4, a, t), τ2 = (1.4, b, t)
and τ3 = (1.4, c, t).
Fig. 7 Example network with non-ontinuous edge lateny funtion and resulting routing
in the ase of the grand oalition.
In the ase of singleton oalitions eah player splits his tra into two
equal parts and sends them on the two possible routes to t. In this way eah
edge with non-zero lateny funtion has a lateny ost of 2 (as ⌈1.4⌉ = 2).
For partitions π = {i, j}{k}, player i and j route on the jointly used edge 1
amount of tra and send the rest on the other routes. As a result on the other
two edge the tra is inreased to 1.6 however this hange does not aet the
lateny ost of these two edges. Finally in the ase of grand oalition it is not
3 ⌈x⌉ denotes the upper integer part of x.
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hard to see that the players an send only 1 amount of tra with a lateny
ost of 1 the rest has to be sent for a lateny ost of 2. Therefore the total
ost is 7.4. Emptiness of the ore follows from the fat that the ost saving of
any two person oalition is the same as the ost saving of the grand oalition
(see Table 6).
partition (pi) ost of players (c(j)) values of oalitions (v(S))
{i},{j},{k} 2.8, 2.8, 2.8 0,0,0
{i,j},{k} 4.6, 2.8 1, 0
{i,j,k} 7.4 1
Table 6 Emptiness of the ore in a network with non-ontinuous edge lateny funtion.
4 Conlusions and future work
In this artile a new family of PFF form delivery games on routing networks
has been introdued. Various routing strategies have been analyzed, and it
has been shown that the sequene of preditive strategies of inreasing order
may onverge to a NE routing onguration, but it an be also divergent.
We have shown on the widely known Pigou network that NE routing may
exist in suh games, where the nOPS is divergent. We provided examples of
subadditive senarios in various ases, and thus have proven that the dened
game is not neessary superadditive. Furthermore we analyzed the stability
of the game, and the evolution of the geometry of stable payo sets via the
reursive ore onept. In addition we have shown that assuming non monotone
or non ontinuous lateny funtions the reursive ore may be empty.
One straightforward open question is whether the reursive ore may be
empty if we suppose ontinuous (stritly) monotone inreasing lateny fun-
tions. An other open problem is how to provide neessary and suient on-
ditions for the sequene of iterative strategies to onverge to a NE. We hope
that the approah of potential methods desribed in (Nisan et al, 2007) may
oer useful tools for the analysis of this problem.
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Appendix A
In this appendix the detailed alulations regarding network 1 depited in
Fig. 1 assuming FOPS strategy an be found, to demonstrate the preditive
strategies.
Determination of routing paths aording to the zero order strategy
To determine the routing under FOPS strategy, rst we have to alulate the
resulting routing in the ase of zero order strategy. In the ase of singleton
oalitions, all players neglet the ativity of other players, and determine their
routing variables (x) by minimizing
cexp(D,pi)(S) =
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e + f
S
e ) · f
S
e
where λ̂Se = 0 for all e ∈ E and for all S ∈ π. In this ase resulting load and
latenies of the network will be as depited in Fig. 8, and listed in Table 2.
The routing variables x uniquely determine the edge ows fSe .
a
b
1
d
1
e
2
c
4.75
1
f
1
5.75a
b
2.75
d
2.75
e
1.5
c
4.75
6
f
1.5
5.75
1.5
1.25
0.25
2.5
6
3.5
3
Fig. 8 Resulting routing loads, and edge latenies assuming zero order strategy and single-
ton oalitions.
The resulting total delivery osts of the oalitions (whih are the players
themself in this ase) an be alulated as:
c(1) = (3 + (6− x1) + (3− x2 − x3))3
c(2) = (x1 + x3)x1 + 2(6 − x1) + (6 − x1 + 3− x2 − x3 + 3)(6 − x1) + 6
c(3) = (0.5 + x2)x2 + (3− x2) + 2(3 − x2 − x3) + (x1 + x3)x3
+((3 − x2 − x3) + (6− x1) + 3)(3 − x2 − x3) (5)
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In the above ase the delivery osts will be c(1) = 17.25, c(2) = 42, c(3) =
12.625, as listed in Table 3. As it an be seen, the zero order strategy (not
surprisingly) signiantly underestimates the routing osts.
Other oalition strutures
In the ase of other partitions, the alulations are similar. Eah oalition opti-
mizes the routing variables orresponding to the partiipating players, taking
into aount the resulting load the oalition puts on the network. The resulting
routing variables and osts are listed in tables 2 and 3.
Determination of routing paths aording to the rst order preditive strategy
(FOPS)
π = {1}, {2}, {3}
The route planning of player 1 is still trivial (his expeted ost is 8.25 in this
ase).
Player 2 will assume that player 1 and player 3 will route their deliv-
ery aording to the zero order strategy. This will result in the minimization
of the value of c(2) (see Eq. 5) assuming [x2 x3] = [1.5 1.25] (c
exp(2) =
c(2)|[x2 x3]=[1.5 1.25]) this implies x1 = 4.
Aording to the zero order routing of players 1 and 2, the expeted ost of
player 3 will be cexp(3) = c(3)|x1=3.5, whih is minimal at [x2 x3] = [2.5 0.5].
In this ase the delivery osts will be as follows. c(1) = 15, c(2) = 38, and
c(3) = 10.25. As it an be seen when ompared to the zero order strategy, in
the ase of singleton oalitions the FOPS in this ase has redued the total
ost of all players.
π = {1, 2},{3}
The expeted ost of the oalition {1, 2} is
cexp({1, 2}) = c(1) + c(2)|[x2 x3]=[1.5 1.25]
whih is minimal at x1 = 4.75. The routing of player 3 will be as before. The
routing osts will be c(1) = 12.75, c(2) = 38.75 and c(3) = 10.625. Thus the
benet of the ooperation for oalition {1, 2} is 1.5, while the value of player
3 is -0.375 in this partition.
π = {1, 3},{2}
In this ase, player 1 and player 3 an not improve their routing, the resulting
will be the same as in the singleton ase. The expeted ost of the oali-
tion {1, 3} is cexp({1, 3}) = c(1) + c(3)|x1=3.5 whih is minimal at [x2 x3] =
[2.5 0.5]. c(1) = 15, c(2) = 38, and c(3) = 10.25.
π = {1},{2, 3}
The expeted ost of the oalition {2, 3} is cexp({2, 3}) = c(2) + c(3) whih
is minimal at [x1 x2 x3] = [4.25 3 0]. c(1) = 14.25, c(2) = 35.875, and
c(3) = 10.5. This implies a benet of 1.875 to the oalition {2, 3}.
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π = {1, 2, 3}
The resulting routing in the ase of the grand oalition is the same as under the
zero order strategy. This implies here the benet of 4 for the grand oalition.
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